Thumper the Infinitesimal Rabbit: A Fictionalist Perspective on Some "Unimaginable" Model Systems in Biology by McLoone, Brian
Thumper the Infinitesimal Rabbit: A
Fictionalist Perspective on Some
“Unimaginable” Model Systems in Biology
Brian McLoone1
1School of Philosophy, National Research University Higher
School of Economics, Staraya Basmannaya st. no. 21/4,
Moscow 105066, Russia; bmcloone@hse.ru
March 31, 2019
Abstract
Fictionalists believe that scientific models are about model systems
that are imaginary. Weisberg has claimed that fictionalism is indefen-
sible because many scientific models are about model systems that are
unimaginable. According to a certain account of imagination, what
Weisberg says is plausible. According to another, more defensible ac-
count of imagination, it is not. I discuss these issues within the context
of an allegedly unimaginable model system in ecology, but the conclu-
sions I draw are more general. I then describe how fictionalism should
be recast in order to deal with Weisberg’s critique.
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1 Introduction
I assume a model is a set of propositions that is expressed as a mathematical
formalism and that is interpreted by some person to be about some thing. The
system that is precisely described by the mathematics of the model is the model
system. Not all models are mathematical, to be sure. But this paper is only
about mathematical models.
Some proponents of fictionalism have argued that we should think of model
systems as imaginary. Godfrey-Smith refers to these systems as “imagined con-
crete things” (2006, 734-735). Frigg calls them “imagined physical systems”
(2010, 253). Toon says models “prescribe imaginings about” a model system
(2010, passim).
Michael Weisberg (2013) has claimed this view won’t work, since some
models are about model systems that are “unimaginable.” As one example,
Weisberg discusses models in ecology that are ordinary differential equations
(ODEs). Weisberg claims we can’t imagine organisms coming in non-integer
values. But, when one uses an ODE to model the growth of a population of
organisms, population size is treated as a continuous, not discrete, quantity.
Thus, Weisberg concludes, the model system can’t be imagined, and fictional-
ism must be false.
Whether Weisberg’s anti-fictionalist argument succeeds depends on what
sense of “imagination” the fictionalist is committed to. If the fictionalist be-
lieves that to imagine a model system requires one to have a visual representa-
tion of it, then what Weisberg says is plausible. And indeed, some fictionalists,
at least some of the time, do appear to treat imagination as a primarily visual
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activity (e.g., Godfrey-Smith 2006; Levy 2015).
But fictionalists need not be—in fact, should not be—committed to such a
restrictive account of imagination. Imagination can be non-visual and, impor-
tantly for our purposes, one can imagine what is conceptually impossible. In
other words, fictionalism is compatible with the sorts of model systems that
animate Weisberg’s critique, so long as fictionalists adopt a sufficiently robust
account of what imagination is, along with a more careful account of the way
in which model systems are imaginary. Below, I show how this can be done.
Why does this debate matter? Many if not most philosophers of science
think of a scientific theory as a collection of models. But there are a number of
competing accounts of what models are and how modeling works. Fictionalism,
the new kid on the block, has become a prominent way to think about these
issues, and so it is important to assess whether Weisberg’s anti-fictionalist
argument succeeds. While I’ll show that Weisberg’s argument ultimately fails,
along the way we’ll see that his argument makes clear which formulations of
fictionalism will not work, and which will. This is essential information for us
fictionalists as we further develop the approach.
2 The Problem of Unimaginable Model Sys-
tems
In this section I’ll present Weisberg’s argument against the fictionalist claim
that model systems are imaginary. I have added a few details that render the
argument more filled in, but the argument is by and large what one finds in
Weisberg (2013, chapter 4.4).
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The concepts we have of certain organisms appear to entail that these
organisms come in only non-negative integers.1 True, RABBIT does not have a
clean set of necessary and sufficient conditions like TRIANGLE and BACHELOR
do, but RABBIT does seem to entail that a population cannot have, say, 3.1528
rabbits. Couched in the language of possible worlds, we might say there is
a conceptually possible world about which “Sally owns one rabbit” is true,
though no conceptually possible world about which “Sally owns 3.1528 rabbits”
is true. To be sure, if we put Sally’s rabbits in a meat grinder, we can treat
the resultant quantity as continuous. And perhaps we might think of a rabbit
embryo as in some sense a “partial” rabbit. But the models that Weisberg
discusses are about living rabbits, out of the womb. Such rabbits are, it
seems, necessarily discrete.
Indeed, we might insist that 3.1528 rabbits is not just conceptually im-
possible, but also unimaginable. After all, there is undoubtedly a sense in
which I cannot imagine such a collection of rabbits. I cannot conjure a visual
representation of it, for example.
This line of reasoning seems to underlie Weisberg’s claim that there are
models in science whose corresponding model systems are “unimaginable.” We
see this in his discussion of the Lotka-Volterra model. In its standard form,
Lotka-Volterra is a system of ODEs that describes the relative abundance
of predators and prey in some ecosystem (equations 1-2) (Murray 2002, 79).
Suppose that the prey are rabbits and that the predators are foxes. Equation
1Some might say rabbits come in only non-negative integers as a matter of “metaphysical
necessity.” I will describe the issue in terms of “conceptual necessity,” since my hunch is
that it is our concepts that are doing the work here, not mind-independent metaphysical
truths.
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1 says the rate of change of the abundance of rabbits (x ) is a function of the
rate at which they reproduce (a) and the rate at which they are eaten by foxes
(b). Equation 2 says the rate of change of the abundance of foxes (y) is a




= ax− bxy (1)
dy
dt
= cxy − dy (2)
The key point is that equations 1-2 treat the populations of rabbits and foxes
as continuous quantities; the relative abundance of each species is drawn from
a segment of the reals. A consequence of this is that, given a specific setting
of the parameters, we can show that at some point in time there will be, for
instance, 3.1528 rabbits in the population.
According to Weisberg, this is where the fictionalist gets into trouble. The
fictionalist wants to maintain that equations 1-2 are about an “imaginary”
system. But one can only imagine rabbits and foxes coming in non-negative
integers: “For a fictionalist, a model of predation has to be composed of con-
crete populations of discrete and distinct individuals” (2013, 62). Equations
1-2, in contrast, are what Weisberg calls a “population-level” model—there
are no discrete, distinct individuals—and such population-level models “can’t
be imagined in their entirety,” which “rules out the possibility of equating such
models with imagined fictional scenarios” (Ibid., 63).
This is not Weisberg’s only argument against fictionalism, but it strikes
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me as the most compelling.2 It also has broad reach. The same argument will
apply to any model in which one tracks infinitesimal changes in the size of some
population if that population is composed of organisms that are necessarily
discrete. There are many such models in biology.
3 Imagination and Conceptual Impossibility
Weisberg says very little about what he means by “imagination” or what
it is for something to be “unimaginable.” Based on what he does say, how-
ever, Weisberg appears to equate imagination with visual representation. For
instance, he writes, “Even highly idealized models of the reactions of simple
molecules consist of potential energy surfaces in state spaces of high dimen-
sionality. No chemist can hold this picture in her mind and hence cannot di-
rectly reason about the imagined system” (2013, 69, my emphasis). Likewise,
Weisberg seems to maintain that since a scientist cannot visualize a continu-
ous population of rabbits—she cannot “hold this picture in her mind”—many
ODEs in ecology and evolutionary biology are about model systems that are
similarly unimaginable.
As Odenbaugh (2015) notes, Weisberg has adopted a quite narrow account
of imagination. In fact, the type of imagination that Weisberg describes is
sometimes referred to as “imagistic imagination” in order to distinguish it from
other, non-visual forms of imagination (Van Leeuwen 2013; Salis and Frigg,
forthcoming). A moment’s reflection reveals this distinction to be sensible:
we can imagine the smell of a campfire; what dog food might taste like; and
2For a critical discussion of these other arguments, see Odenbaugh (2015).
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what it would feel like to have one’s tongue pierced. We can also imagine the
content of a conversation we will have with a friend, in which case what we
have access to are phonological representations (i.e., “inner speech”).
Moreover, imagination often involves adopting an attitude toward a propo-
sition, and such “propositional imagination” need not have a visual component
either. I’ll say that to propositionally imagine that P is to act or reason as
though P were true while bracketing one’s actual beliefs about P ’s truth-value.
(As with some other fictionalists, I will say that to imagine that P is also to
“pretend” or “make-believe” that P. The latter term is used in Kendall Wal-
ton’s work, from which fictionalists take a great deal of inspiration (see, e.g.,
Walton [1990]).) So construed, one can imagine what is false, what is true, or
what has a truth-value that is unknown.
What is important for our purposes is that one can imagine that P without
visualizing a world about which P is true. For instance, if someone tells me to
imagine that all tuna are mortal and that, moreover, Chucky is a tuna, I myself
don’t need to visualize any tuna before concluding that Chucky is mortal. This
is even more obviously the case when someone tells me to imagine that all T s
are M and that c is a T. Aphantasiacs’ ability to voluntarily create visual
imagery is diminished if not lacking entirely, but they are perfectly capable
of doing logic or, for that matter, understanding a piece of literature (Zeman,
Dewar, and Della Sala 2015).
Of particular relevance to the present discussion is whether we can imagine
what is conceptually impossible. I agree with Weisberg, or at least I am willing
to grant the point, that we cannot visualize what is conceptually impossible
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(e.g., an object that is both A and ¬A; a squared circle; 3.1528 rabbits). But
it does not follow from this that we cannot imagine these things.
In fact, it seems clear that we can imagine what is conceptually impossible.3
Often, sentential expressions of this type of imagination have the form of a
subjunctive or counterfactual conditional. Consider the following examples:
(a) “Were both A and ¬A true, then I could prove that B is true.”
(b) “If circles are squares, then Euclid had it all wrong.”
(c) “If Hobbes had squared the circle, then he would have been a famous
mathematician.”4
(d) “If Hobbes had squared the circle, then the storming of the Bastille
would have happened in June, rather than July.”
The antecedents of these conditionals refer to what is conceptually impossible,
but we can imagine (i.e., make-believe or pretend) they are true. After all,
that is how we know that the consequents follow from the antecedents in
the first three sentences, but not the fourth (see Priest [2016] for the same
argument). Yet, unless the reader has some powers of visualization unknown
to me, it seems we do not visualize the antecedents of these conditionals when
we imagine their truth. Hence, not all imagination is visual, and, more to the
point, we can imagine what is conceptually possible despite that we cannot
visualize it.
So an account of imagination that treats imagination as a purely imagistic
3In their taxonomy of forms of imagination, Salis and Frigg (forthcoming) refer to this
type of imagination as a form of “counterfactual reasoning.” Goodman (2006a, 2006b) would
call it a form of “suppositional imagination.”
4This example is adapted from Priest (2001, 66).
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affair will fail. Which account of imagination will succeed? There is no consen-
sus on this topic, in either philosophy or cognitive science. I have suggested,
however, that propositional imagination works as follows: We “bracket” our
actual belief about a proposition’s truth-value while, simultaneously, provi-
sionally assuming the proposition’s truth and inferring its consequences. Ap-
plied to sentences (a)-(d), to assess the truth of each conditional we act as
though the antecedent were true and then determine whether the consequent
is thereby rendered true or at least plausible. Sometimes, as with (a), this
inference seems deductive. But this is not always so. For instance, (c) seems
to rely on causal inferences about the sociology of mathematics.
This account of propositional imagination is similar to Nichols and Stich’s
account of pretense (Nichols and Stich 2003, chapter 2). According to their ac-
count, an act of pretense involves manipulating premises in a “Possible World
Box” (PWB). One imagines a possible world about which the premises are
true, then infers the consequences. Crucially, the truth-values assigned to the
premises in the PWB are “quarantined” from the rest of the cognitive system,
so in the PWB we can treat as true what we might otherwise believe is false or
unknown. This seems to be how propositional imagination works too. That’s
how we can reason about circles being squares without actually believing they
are.
Now let’s apply all of this to the fictionalist idea that model systems are
“imaginary.” Recall, I assume a model is a set of propositions.5 When a mod-
eler considers a model, she adopts a particular attitude toward these proposi-
5I am certainly not the first to do so. See, for instance, Thomson-Jones (2006).
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tions; namely, she imagines (or pretends or make-believes) they are true and,
then, infers the consequences. (In the case of mathematical models, such infer-
ence often will be deductive.) According to the version of fictionalism I favor,
imagination is involved here not because the modeler visualizes a correspond-
ing model system, but because the modeler’s belief that the propositions that
constitute the model are true is provisional. Often if not typically, in fact, the
modeler knows that various assumptions in the model are false—no popula-
tion is infinitely large, or perfectly well-mixed, and so on—but she pretends
they are true nevertheless.
When the role of imagination in modeling is construed in this manner,
there is no basis to claim Lotka-Volterra, or other models that treat discrete
organisms as infinitesimals, are unimaginable. A model system is imaginable
if one can act or reason as though the propositions that constitute the cor-
responding model are true. And we clearly can act as reason as though the
propositions that constitute Lotka-Volterra are true, since we can derive their
mathematical consequences. That the model system cannot be visualized is
irrelevant.
Before moving on, there are two further issues I should address. First,
perhaps Weisberg does not believe visual representation is necessary for imag-
ination, but rather that imagination requires a more general, “perception-like”
experience. Since we can have no such perception-like experience of, say, a con-
tinuous population of rabbits, the argument would go, such a model system
is thereby unimaginable. (I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this
possibility to my attention.)
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While this is a possible reading of Weisberg, it does not help his argument,
for the simple reason that propositional imagination need not be perception-
like in some broader sense either. For instance, I can imagine that all F s are
G—all Flubs are Garb, say—while failing to have a perception-like experience
of this fact, visual or otherwise.
Second, I should bring to the foreground another difference between Weis-
berg’s account of modeling and my own. Weisberg describes mathematical
models as “mathematical structures” that a modeler “interprets” or “con-
strues” in a particular manner (2013, 29, 39). This is different from what I
say modeling involves. A “construal,” for Weisberg, establishes “relations of
denotation between the model and real-world targets” (Ibid, 39). That is, a
modeler interprets the mathematical expressions as being about a real world
system. In contrast, according to my account, and to the fictionalist approach
in general, a mathematical model is about an imaginary system that can then
be compared to a real world system, if one wishes.
This last point raises an interesting epistemological question for the fiction-
alist: If model systems are imaginary, fictional worlds, then how do we compare
these model systems to the real world? This is of course not the place to dis-
cuss this issue in full; I wish mainly to draw attention to its existence. But one
plausible view is that the entities, interactions, and states of many fictional
systems can be “close enough” to a real world system that comparisons be-
tween the two are sensible. Take the above ODEs. In the real world, animals
are discrete and their evolutionary dynamics are stochastic, but biologists rou-
tinely use models that construe organisms as continuous and their dynamics
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as deterministic, particularly when population size is large. The thinking here
is that the stochastic behavior of a large population of discrete organisms is
“close enough” to that of an infinite population of continuous organisms that
a comparison between the two is justified. What counts as “close enough” in
these and other cases is of course unclear, and presumably will vary with the
goals the modeler has.
4 Imagination and Probability
The above discussion was focused on Weisberg’s claim that ODEs can
result in unimaginable model systems, but I have not addressed the other al-
legedly unimaginable models that Weisberg describes. These include “aggre-
gate models...ensemble models, probabilistic models, high-dimensional models,
and others” (2013, p. 63). I do not have the space to work through each of
these independently. But in general, note that, once we recognize that imag-
ination includes more than imagistic imagination, it is unclear on what basis
Weisberg can claim these models are “unimaginable.” If one can pretend or
make-believe the models are true, then they are imaginable in the sense that
matters to the fictionalist.
But I will explicitly discuss what Weisberg says about probabilistic models,
since such models are quite common in biology, the primary focus of this paper.
Weisberg’s argument that probabilistic models are unimaginable is based
around his argument that “probabilistic interactions” are unimaginable. The
idea is this: When you imagine, for instance, that a prey dies, you can only
imagine that single death, which, according to Weisberg, is not sufficient for
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you to imagine the death as a probabilistic event. As Weisberg explains, “Any
given fictional scenario will be a single instantiation of the probabilistic interac-
tions. But how can a single instantiation actually represent the probability?”
(2013, 63). Weisberg then claims that, in order to imagine that the event is
probabilistic, you must imagine that the animal is both alive and dead, which,
he claims, cannot be done.6
To assess Weisberg’s argument, let’s consider a concrete example. In fact,
let’s consider the stochastic version of the deterministic Lotka-Volterra model
that I described above. In the stochastic version, we have a finite set of discrete
rabbits and a finite set of discrete foxes. The “reactions” in this system are
as follows: at a rate equal to a, one rabbit gives birth to another rabbit; at a
rate equal to b, when a fox and a rabbit meet, the rabbit dies; at a rate equal
to c, when a fox and a rabbit meet, the fox reproduces; and at a rate equal to
d, a fox dies. We can write this in the formalism common in systems biology
(Wilkinson 2012, chapter 6).
Rabbit




c−−→ 2 Fox + Rabbit (5)
Fox
d−−→ ∅ (6)
The above describes a probabilistic system—rabbits and foxes reproducing
6I am referring to a passage in which Weisberg claims “no individual can be both alive
or dead” (2013, 63). Clearly, Weisberg meant to say “alive and dead.”
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and dying according to a continuous time Markov process. Now, suppose the
next event in the time evolution of this system is that a rabbit dies. The model
itself tells us the event is probabilistic; on this I am confident Weisberg and
I agree. But, as mentioned, Weisberg says we cannot imagine this event as
probabilistic because doing so would require us to imagine that the rabbit is
both “alive and dead.”
Let’s set aside whether it is possible to imagine contradictions, and instead
focus on Weisberg’s claim that to imagine an event as probabilistic requires
one to imagine that the event both occurred and did not occur (i.e., both
e and ¬e). This claim is incorrect. Indeed, the occurrence of two mutually
exclusive events would violate the Kolmogorov axioms, since the probability
of their joint occurrence is 0. Rather, to imagine an event as probabilistic is to
imagine that the event occurred but that it was possible for the event to have
not occurred (i.e., both e and ♦¬e). Applied to the present case, to imagine
a single rabbit death as probabilistic is to imagine that the rabbit died but
that some other event could have occurred instead. Even on the (problematic)
supposition that imagination requires visualization, imagining counterfactuals
of this sort does not seem particularly difficult. Our capacity to do so is what
makes the literary genre of alternate history possible, after all. Philip K. Dick’s
The Man in the High Castle is about an America in which the Axis powers
won World War II, rather than the Allies. The story is disturbing precisely
because it portrays a world that is easy to imagine.
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5 Making Fictionalism Safe for Formal Mod-
els
Where does all of this leave fictionalism? Some fictionalist work has as-
sumed, or at least implied, that visualization is a central if not necessary fea-
ture of imagination. For instance, Godfrey-Smith says, “An imaginary popu-
lation is something that, if it was real, would be a flesh-and-blood population”
and that fictional worlds are similar to “entities like Sherlock Holmes’ London,
and Tolkien’s Middle Earth” (2006, 735). Godfrey-Smith appears to charac-
terize these “imaginary populations” imagistically. What we imagine when
we consider a formal model in biology is a system of organisms or genes that
are like the real thing; these model systems “would be concrete if they were
real” (Ibid., 735). Levy is more explicit. As he explains, “Imagining typically
involves having a visual or other sensory-like mental state—a ‘seeing in the
mind’s eye’” (2015, 785).
Weisberg’s argument shines a spotlight on the difficulties that any account
of modeling will face if imagination is treated as central to modeling and
visualization is regarded as a necessary component of imagination. Weisberg’s
criticism is therefore relevant not just to fictionalism, but to other accounts
of modeling in which visualization is taken to play an essential role (see, e.g.,
Morgan 2012, chapter 3). Many models in science are simply too outre´ for
us to visualize, and those that we can visualize constitute only a fraction—in
some fields, a small fraction—of the models that people are interested in.
Fortunately for the fictionalist, imagination need not be yoked to visual-
ization in this way. To my mind, the core feature of fictionalism is the way it
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construes the attitude a modeler adopts toward a model. A modeler engages in
a game of counterfactual make-believe when considering a model. She brackets
her actual beliefs about the truth-values of the various propositions that con-
stitute the model, then pretends all the propositions of the model are true in
order to infer the model’s consequences. A willingness to provisionally imagine
to be true what we might otherwise know to be false is a noteworthy similar-
ity between modeling and reading fiction. This component of fictionalism is
defensible, once we appreciate the scope of imagination.
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